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Bank Recapitalisation and Credit Growth: The Indian Case 
Radheshyam Verma and Snehal S. Herwadkar1    
The continuing deterioration in asset quality of public sector banks in India since 2012 
has had multidimensional ramifications. On the one hand, while significant loan loss 
provisions were required to be kept, eroding the profitability of these banks, on the 
other hand, it affected their risk-taking ability and resources available for on-lending 
to commercial sector. From a macroeconomic perspective thus, poor asset quality and 
lower economic growth reinforced each other into a vicious cycle. The government 
intermittently infused capital in the public-sector banks, but most of that was absorbed 
by the continuing deterioration in asset quality, delaying the revival in the credit 
growth cycle. This led to the question of how much capital infusion is necessary to 
kick-start the credit cycle. Using bank-wise data for the period 2008-18, the present 
study analyses this question in a dynamic panel framework. The findings of the study 
suggest that the relationship between bank capital and credit growth is non-linear. 
Any amount of recapitalisation in banks is may be helpful in accelerating credit 
growth. However, the study found the single threshold level 13.1 per cent of CRAR 
level would be optimal. Above this threshold level, incremental increase in bank 
capital has positive but declining marginal effects on lending 
JEL Classification: G21, G28.  
Keywords: Bank capital, regulatory capital, recapitalisation, bank lending.  
Motivation 
The progressive deterioration in asset quality of Indian public-sector banks (PSBs) 
since 2012 has led to considerable increase in loan loss provisioning requirements, 
affecting their profitability adversely and also to an erosion of their capital base.  
Simultaneously the credit growth has remained anaemic till 2018 before the recent 
revival. This led to the hypothesis among analysts that the capital shortfall of the banks 
is one of the major factors constraining their credit growth. The intermittent doses of 
capital infusion by the Government were just sufficient (or in some cases less than 
sufficient) for banks to meet the minimum capital requirements and keep their head 
above the water. In fact, during last three years, the seventy percent of the capital 
infusion in PSBs was eroded by their growing losses. In this scenario, it is pertinent to 
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ask whether the piecemeal approach in bank recapitalisation is helpful in reviving 
credit growth or does it just amount to wastage of exchequer money?  
Against this background, the present paper analyses the relationship between bank 
recapitalisation and credit growth in a panel Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
framework. The results suggest that the relationship is nonlinear in nature; till a certain 
threshold level of capital infusion, the deceleration in credit growth remained 
unabated. Beyond a certain threshold however capital infusion was instrumental in 
kick-starting the credit growth.  
Although the interrelationship between capital infusion and credit growth has been 
studied in the context of advanced economies, such studies are scarce in the Indian 
context and the present paper makes an important contribution in this regard. The 
findings of the paper are likely to be important from policy perspective as it crystallises 
the relationship between recapitalisation and bank lending and brings more clarity to 
aid the decision-making process.   
Stylised Facts 
The world over, the need for recapitalisation of banks is often triggered by 
macroeconomic or banking crises which erode the capital base of the banks. Major 
examples of this include the capital infusion in Japanese banks in the 1990s and more 
recently recapitalisation in Swiss, UK and US banks after the global financial crisis 
(GFC). Another, although less frequent, trigger is recalibration of regulatory 
requirements that necessitate higher capital2. The mechanisms of recapitalisation have 
also differed; although raising more capital through the markets is a preferable option, 
in majority of the cases it is not feasible and the burden of recapitalisation has been 
largely borne by central banks or the government3.  
In the Indian context, recapitalisation of banks is a recurrent buzzword although the 
issue and challenges faced are somewhat unique, due to the dominance of public sector 
banks with majority shareholding of the government and resistance to dilute the 
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3
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shareholding of government4. It is for this purpose that the Union Budgets have 
regularly earmarked funds for recapitalisation of banks, apart from providing 
recapitalisations as a part of fiscal stimulus5.  
Two factors, intertwined together, have contributed to an increase in the necessary 
quantum and sense of urgency for bank recapitalisation in the recent period. First, the 
phased transition to Basel III norms which required higher and better quality capital 
to be maintained by the banks and second, the deterioration in asset quality, which 
necessitated larger provisions and higher capital requirements.  
The Basel III capital regulation has been implemented from April 1, 2013 in India in 
phases and it is expected to be fully implemented by March 31, 2019. The estimates 
on capital shortfall due to implementation of these regulations have differed. For 
example, the initial estimates of the Reserve Bank projected an additional capital 
requirement of Rs. 5 trillion, consisting of non-equity capital of the order of Rs. 3.25 
trillion while equity capital of nearly Rs. 1.75 trillion (Subbarao, 2012)6. The two 
important assumptions on which the estimates were based include: risk weighted 
assets of individual banks were expected to increase by 20 per cent per annum and 
banks were expected to fund 1 per cent capital requirements through retained earnings 
These assumptions, however, did not materialise in the subsequent years as the non-
performing assets (NPAs) of banks, especially that of public sector banks increased 
sharply from 3.3 per cent in end-March 2012 to 14.6 per cent in March-2018 requiring 
banks to earmark greater provisions, which in turn adversely affected their 
profitability.  
In the wake of these developments, the Indradhanush plan announced by the 
Government in August 2015 envisaged to provide Rs. 700 billion over 2015-16 to 
2018-19 to PSBs so as to better capitalise them and support credit growth. Further, 
recapitalisation of PSBs with Rs. 2.1 trillion announced in October 2017 is planned 
                                                        
4
 The shareholding of government and RBI together ranged between 58 per cent (State Bank of India) 
and 93 per cent (United Bank of India) in nationalized banks as at end-March 2018.  
5
 An example of budgetary provision for recapitalization of nationalized banks is Union Budget of 
1993-94 which earmarked Rs. 5,700 crore to help the banks meet the first stage implementation of 
Basel I norms. An example of fiscal stimulus is the government infusion of nearly Rs. 3,100 crore in 
the aftermath of global financial crisis as tier I capital in a few PSBs.  
6
 Other agencies placed the capital infusion requirement at a higher level e.g. around the same time 
international credit ratings agency Fitch estimated this figure to be at around USD 50 billion, while 
ICRA projected a figure of around USD 80 billion.  
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over 2017-18 and 2018-197. Out of Rs. 2.1 trillion, Rs. 1.53 billion will be through 
infusion of capital by the Government and the balance is envisaged through capital 
raising by banks themselves from markets and unlock value from their non-core assets. 
Government has provided Rs. 881 billion for 2017-18. Capital infusion to the tune of 
Rs. 650 billion was initially planned for 2018-19 which was raised to Rs. 1,060 billion 
on December 20, 2018 by the Government aimed at meeting regulatory capital norms 
and strengthening amalgamating banks by providing regulatory and growth capital 
(Chart 1).  
In the last three years (between 2015-16 and 2017-18) on average more than 70 per 
cent of the infused capital in the PSBs was eaten up by losses incurred by them (Chart 
2). This left the PSBs with little capital to build up their capital base.  
Chart 1: Asset Quality, Capital Adequacy 
and Capital Infusion in PSBs 
Chart 2: Capital Infusion and Net Profits 
 
 
 
 
During the same period, the credit growth has been tepid and decelerated continuously 
to reach nadir of de-growth in 2016-17. This led suggestions in the media as well as 
among analysts that the delicate capital conditions of the banks, especially PSBs, 
adversely affected their ability to lend resources to the commercial sector. It is 
noteworthy that the credit growth has remained tepid notwithstanding intermittent 
bouts of capital infusion, leading to the hypothesis that only if the recapitalisation 
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 Includes Rs. 81.4 billion of the residual amount under Indradhanush envisaged for FY 2017-18. 
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amount is large enough relative to their total capital base, it can make some perceptible 
impact on credit growth (Chart 3).  
 
A careful empirical analysis is however required for establishing the hypothesis. This 
is because this period was also characterised by intermittent bouts of growth 
slowdown leading to the question whether the credit slowdown was a supply side or 
demand side phenomenon. In other words, we need to make amends for the slowdown 
in growth and resultant slowdown in credit demand to understand whether credit 
slowdown was due to insufficient bank recapitalisation.  
Literature Review 
There exists a vast empirical literature which examines the two channels through 
which weak capital base of the bank may impact its lending activity: one, the bank 
may try to conserve its capital and any capital in excess of minimum regulatory 
requirement may be either used to finance retail loans, which typically have lower 
NPAs or may be invested, possibly in government bonds. As such productive sectors 
of the economy may remain credit starved. Second, weakly capitalised banks are 
perceived as riskier by depositors and investors, which increases its cost of funding 
through bonds and unsecured deposits, which in turn affects their lending activity 
adversely. In the post GFC period, the second channel is found to be pervasive; a 1 
percentage point increase in the equity-to-assets ratio is associated with 4 bps 
reduction in the cost of debt financing of banks. This reduction in cost, in turn, 
translates into greater lending: one percentage point increase in the equity to assets 
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ratio is shown to increase annual credit growth by 0.6 percentage point (Gambacorta 
and Shim, 2016).  
A more serious outcome of the undercapitalised banks is their increased incentive for 
evergreening of loans. A chronically undercapitalized bank—especially in the absence 
of enough supervisory vigil—has an incentive to rollover loans of financially weak 
existing borrowers. These borrowers, in turn, are able to use these funds for repayment 
of their immediate obligations thus keeping their head above the water, while the 
banks can avoid classifying these loans as NPAs. This way the bank avoids making 
additional provisions and further erosion in their capital base. A fallout of this is that 
the loan supply is shifted away from more creditworthy firms to less credit worthy 
firms (Acharya, 2017). 
The economic literature is unanimous in stressing that in order to avoid such outcomes 
it is necessary that the banks should be adequately capitalised. A related question is 
about the ‘optimal’ amount of recapitalisation to ensure that the credit flow to the 
economy is not constrained.  In practice fiscal constraints of the government, 
uncertainty whether financial markets may adequately pick-up the tab and moral 
hazard concerns of the central bank may translate into lesser dosses of recapitalisation 
of the bank than what is required.  
Previous literature in this regard suggests that banks can turn additional capital into 
greater lending only once their capitalisation exceeds a critical threshold as 
undercapitalised banks try to restore their regulatory capital ratio without generating 
new lending (Brei et al, 2013). Their findings thus suggest that recapitalisations 
beyond a certain threshold, is able to sustain credit by helping banks to survive 
extreme distress, and by moving their capital ratios into a territory that allows banks 
to expand their lending again. 
In the case of Japanese banks too, Giannetti and Simonov (2013) found that if capital 
injections were large enough to reestablish bank capital requirements, it increases the 
supply of credit and spurs investment. Capital injections that are too small, fail to 
increase the supply of credit, but they also encourage the ever-greening of 
nonperforming loans. Berrospide and Edge (2010), on the other hand in the context of 
United States found that capital ratios associated with both the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) related capital injections in 2008 and subsequent efforts to raise 
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capital privately by banks during 2009 made only a small positive contribution to bank 
loan growth and were more than offset by adverse factors such as reduced loan 
demand, increased risk, and somewhat tighter lending standards. 
The present paper takes this strand of literature ahead by asking whether small doses 
of recapitalisation in India are useful in reviving bank credit growth.  
Data and Methodology  
The basic model that we estimate using a panel of 21 PSBs is as follows:  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡=  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡−𝑛 + 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑛+ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙_𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−𝑛2 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−𝑛+ 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐_𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛 + 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦_𝐴𝑄𝑅𝑡 
The primary focus of the paper is evaluating the interrelationship between capital 
infusion and credit growth. In the model specification. apart from bank capital 
infusion, the paper also introduces square of capital infusion as an explanatory variable 
to capture the possible non-linearity in their relationship following Brei et al (2012). 
In other words, the quadratic specification of the capital infusion term is designed to 
capture the non-linearity in the relationship. Apart from the capital base of the banks, 
their lending is typically determined by a combination of bank specific and 
macroeconomic factors which are accounted for in our framework by introduction of 
several control variables. The bank specific control variables include tier I capital 
ratio, capital to risk weighted assets ratio (CRAR), net interest income (NIM), return 
on assets (RoA), gross non-performing assets (GNPAs) ratio, total stressed assets 
(GNPAs + restructured standard advances) 8  as per cent of gross advances and 
weighted average lending rate (WALR), while the nominal GDP growth is used as a 
macroeconomic control variables. Using alternate combinations of these control 
variables, a variety of models were tested. One of the limitations of testing how bank 
specific and macroeconomic variables impact bank lending is that the financial 
conditions of banks could, in turn impact the macroeconomic conditions and monetary 
                                                        
8 Till the Reserve Bank undertook the Asset Quality Review (AQR) (elaborated subsequently) in 2015, 
evergreening of assets was rampant and the GNPA ratio did not paint a realistic picture of the banking 
stress. In order to overcome this issue, restructured advances are added to the GNPA to get a more 
realistic stressed asset ratio.  
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policy cycles.  In order to take care of such endogeneity, we use the Arellano-Bond 
dynamic panel model, which uses GMM method and yields consistent and unbiased 
estimates of relationship. Lags of liquid assets to total assets, deposit to loan ratio, 
NIM were used as instrumental variables. 
The introduction of asset quality review by the Reserve Bank in 2015-16, aimed at 
making banks recognise their asset quality realistically, was a watershed moment in 
the Indian banking history. Data available on bank lending till the initiation of AQR 
consisted of two components: amount extended for evergreening of loans and new 
loans. It is difficult to segregate the loans data in these two components. In order to 
take care of this, a dummy on AQR is introduced in the model. The dummy takes a 
value of zero before 2015-16 and one otherwise. A variety of specifications where the 
AQR dummy is interacted with other variables are also tested.  
To ensure that coefficients in the model are efficient and consistent, it was tested for 
serial correlation and was found that models were not subject to serial correlation of 
order two. It was also found that instruments were valid as Sargan tests for over-
identifying restrictions were not found significant.  
Annual data for a panel of 21 PSBs for the period 2008-09 to 2017-18 was chosen for 
the study, constrained by the fact that bank-wise capital infusion by the Government 
is available only from this period onwards from Ministry of Finance (2017). Other 
bank specific variables were taken from Statistical Tables Relating to Banks in India 
and macro-economic variables were taken from Database on Indian Economy, 
Reserve Bank of India.  
Empirical Model and Results 
Regression results suggests that capital infusion in levels was not significant in 
influencing loan growth of PSBs. However, the square of the recapitalisations had an 
impact on loan growth of banks with two period lags. Thus, the relationship between 
bank lending and recapitalisation is non-linear. It suggests that small doses of 
recapitalisations of PSBs are not effective enough to lead to higher lending by banks 
as in the environment of high NPAs they are just able to meet their minimum capital 
requirement. Only if the capital infusion is higher than certain threshold that it can 
lead to higher credit growth. The finding is in line with Brei et al (2013), who found 
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that only banks at higher levels of capitalisation can effectively translate additional 
capital into increased lending.  
Table 1: Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
Explanatory Variable Dependent Variable: Loan growth 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Loangrwt-1 -0.126 
(0.15) 
-0.191 
(0.179) 
-0.279** 
(0.065) 
-0.310*** 
(0.114) 
-0.252** 
(0.112) 
-0.272** 
(0.115) 
Loangrwt-2 -0.084 
(0.184) 
-0.023 
(0.211) 
-0.104 
(0.079) 
-0.136 
(0.201) 
-0.086 
(0.180) 
-0.148 
(0.189) 
Loangrwt-3  -0.027 
(0.141) 
 -0.289 
(0.121) 
0.257** 
(0.115) 
-0.261** 
(0.115) 
Lninfusiont-1 0.083 
(0.099) 
0.147 
(0.100) 
 -0.007 
(0.130) 
-0.018 
(0.122) 
-0.043 
(0.071) 
Lninfusiont-2 -0.157* 
(0.094) 
     
Lninfusion2t-1 -0.005 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
 0.0012 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Lninfusion2t-2 0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
 0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
0.001*** 
(0.0006) 
TierIt-1 3.341 
(2.103) 
     
CRARt-1  3.367*** 
(0.937) 
0.827 
(0.626) 
   
CRARsquared   7.091* 
(3.989) 
   
NIMt-1   -0.008 
(0.019) 
   
GNPA ratio   -3.265*** 
(0.388) 
   
Stress    -1.890*** 
(0.437) 
-1.874 
(0.456) 
-1.183*** 
(0.366) 
WALR   -0.679 
(0.867) 
 -5.301 
(4.139) 
 
RoA      0.086** 
(0.041) 
WALRt-1     3.103* 
(1.761) 
 
GDP 1.872*** 
(0.518) 
     
GDPt-1  0.548 
(0.893) 
 -0.2005 
(0.814) 
  
GDPt-2    0.5144 
(0.343) 
  
AQR dummy   -0.228*** 
(0.042) 
   
RoA*AQR      -0.106** 
(0.050) 
Lninfusion*AQR 0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.052* 
(0.030) 
 -0.077*** 
(0.020) 
-0.067*** 
(0.016) 
-0.033 
(0.035) 
Lninfusion2*AQR  0.005** 
(0.002) 
 0.007*** 
(0.021) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
Stress*Lninfusion*AQR   0.194*** 
(0.048) 
  -0.084 
(0.082) 
CRAR*Lninfusion*GNPA -0.542 
(0.415) 
-1.036 
(0.703) 
 -0.483 
(0.562) 
-0.644 
(0.543) 
-0.285 
(0.955) 
Constant -0.283 
(0.652) 
-1.037 
(0.350) 
0.252 
(0.107) 
0.303 
(0.529) 
0.632 
(0.613) 
0.361 
(0.308) 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.48 0.46 0.23 0.64 0.68 0.70 
AR 1 test (p value) 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.05 
AR 2 test (p value) 0.42 0.18 0.91 0.10 0.11 0.10 
No. of observations 63 63 63 63 63 63 
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No. of instruments 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Notes: 1. Figures in parentheses refer to robust standard errors. 
           2.  *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
On interacting capital infusion (in levels) with asset quality review (AQR) dummy, 
capital infusion was found to be negatively associated with credit growth and was also 
found to be significant (Col. 2,4 and 5 in Table 1). This shows that in the environment 
of sharp decline in asset quality due to better classification of assets on account of 
AQR, despite capital infusion credit supply by PSBs declined. However, if we interact 
square of capital infusion with AQR dummy, they are found to be positively related 
and the relation was found to be significant. It suggests that if the capital infusion is 
of significantly higher amount and above certain threshold, it is able to facilitate credit 
growth despite regulatory environment such as AQR.  
If banks are well capitalised as reflected in higher CRAR, it leads to higher credit 
growth. If banks are well capitalised they are better able to withstand output shocks 
and they have to less adjust their lending during economic downturns in order to avoid 
regulatory capital shortfalls (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).  The relation was found 
to be significant with one period lag (Col. 2). However, the relationship between 
CRAR and credit growth may be non-linear as suggested by the coefficient of squared 
CRAR (Col. 3). This suggests that there may be a threshold level of capitalisation at 
which the relationship between bank capital and credit growth changes. This 
relationship is discussed at length in the next section.  
High stressed assets (GNPAs plus restructured standard advances) to total advances, 
which also has negative impact on loan growth through various channels, was found 
to have expected sign and found to be significant (Col. 4 and 6). Similarly, RoA which 
is an indicator of profitability, was found to have positive impact on loan growth. If 
we interact RoA with AQR dummy, it was found to have negative effect on credit 
growth as positive relationship between earnings and credit growth was overshadowed 
by negative effect of AQR on bank lending. Among, macroeconomic controls, as 
expected nominal GDP growth was found to have positive impact on loan growth of 
banks. However, the endogeneity between the two variables was controlled by the 
dynamic panel framework of the model. 
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Testing for the Presence of Threshold level of Bank Capital 
Theory, backed by empirical evidence suggests that well-capitalized banks are able to 
withstand adverse shocks without shrinking their balance sheets, especially their loans 
portfolio, while capital constrained banks are more likely to deleverage (Cohen, 2013; 
Armstrong and Ebell, 2014). Labonne and Lame (2014) found a non-linear positive 
relationship between lending growth and capital ratios in case of French banks with 
more supervisory capital-constrained banks tending to have a credit growth that is less 
sensitive to the capital ratio as compared to unconstrained banks. In contrast, Carlson 
et al (2013) found elasticity of bank lending with respect to capital ratios to be higher 
when capital ratios were relatively low in case of Indonesian banking system. 
The lending activity of a capital starved bank may be constrained as it may try to 
conserve capital to meet the regulatory minimum. Excess capital, if any, may be 
deployed in relatively less risky sectors or invested in risk-free sovereign paper. 
Moreover, weakly capitalised banks are perceived as riskier by depositors and 
investors, increasing their cost of funding through bonds and unsecured deposits, 
which in turn affects their lending activity adversely. Recent empirical research 
suggests that relationship between capital and lending may be non-linear; lending 
growth may pick-up only after bank capital exceeds a critical threshold (Brei et al, 
2013).  
A fixed effect panel threshold regression model following Hansen (1999) using annual 
data of 40 public and private sector banks for the period 2012-13 to 2018-19 to 
estimate the relationship between capital (proxied by CRAR) and loan growth. The 
period starting 2012-13 was chosen as Indian banks started implementing Basel III 
since 2013. The regression suggested a non-linear relationship between the two. The 
endogenously estimated single threshold CRAR was found at around 13.1 per cent, 
which is above the minimum regulatory CRAR (including capital conservation buffer) 
of 10.875 per cent applicable for March 2019. Double and higher thresholds were 
rejected as bootstrap p-values were not found to be significant.  
The relationship between CRAR and loan growth was found to be positive below the 
threshold as well as above the threshold. However, if the CRAR was below the 
threshold, loan growth was higher as compared to when CRAR was above the 
threshold as indicated by the size of β coefficients. For example, when CRAR is below 
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the threshold, the estimates suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in CRAR raises 
bank lending by 1.4–1.7 percentage points (Table 2). However, when capital ratio is 
above the threshold, the estimates suggest that CRAR had a much more modest impact 
on bank lending and relationship with loan growth was weak. Thus, beyond the 
threshold, incremental additions of bank capital have positive but declining marginal 
effects on lending, which is in line with empirical evidence elsewhere (Catalán et al, 
2017). These results remain robust even after controlling for net interest margin 
(NIM), share of liquid assets in total assets, deposit to loan ratio, stressed assets ratio 
and GDP.  
Table 1: Estimates of Panel Threshold Regression Models with Two Regimes 
Model 1 2 3 
Dependent variable = Loan growth  
Threshold 13.17 
p value= 0.022 
13.17 
p value= 0.034 
13.13 
p value= 0.044 
CRAR 
β1 1.495*** 
(-0.546) 
1.395*** 
(0.56) 
1.67*** 
(0.562) 
β2 0.861* 
(-0.476) 
0.816* 
(0.49) 
1.115** 
(0.485) 
Control variables 
NIM 6.652*** 
(1.933) 
6.467*** 
(1.835) 
 
Stress (-1) -0.527** 
(0.266) 
-0.784*** 
(0.268) 
-0.52** 
(0.273) 
Deposit to loan ratio (-1) 
 
0.130** 
(0.059) 
 
Liquid assets to total assets (-1) 0.439** 
(0.192) 
  
Nominal GDP growth 0.78 
(0.909) 
0.992 
(0.749) 
1.659* 
(0.902) 
Demonetisation dummy -0.049*** 
(0.017) 
 
-0.065*** 
(0.017) 
Merger dummy -0.068 
(0.066) 
 
-0.055 
(0.067) 
AQR dummy -0.015 
(0.017) 
 
0.005 
(0.016) 
Constant -0.331*** 
(0.129) 
-0.439*** 
(0.146) 
-0.208 
(0.129) 
R2 0.427 0.327 0.316 
No. of observations 240 240 240 
No. of bootstraps 500 500 500 
Prob > F 0 0 0 
Note: 1. Figures in parentheses refer to standard errors. 
           2.  *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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In the present Indian context, these results suggest that any amount of recapitalisation 
in banks is helpful in accelerating credit growth, however 13.1 per cent CRAR would 
be optimal. Raising capital is costly and also maintaining too much capital would 
translate to less availability of loanable resources. 
Conclusion  
The study found that small and intermittent doses of capital injections by the 
Government in the PSBs over the years, were not helpful in credit growth revival. This 
result hold true even after controlling for various bank-specific and macroeconomic 
factors which take care of stress in the banking sector and demand for credit. The paper 
also asserts that the relationship between bank capital and credit growth is non-linear. 
Any amount of recapitalisation in banks is may be helpful in accelerating credit 
growth. However, the study found the single threshold level 13.1 per cent of CRAR 
level would be optimal. Above this threshold level, incremental increase in bank 
capital has positive but declining marginal effects on lending as raising capital is costly 
and also maintaining too much capital would translate into less availability of loanable 
funds. 
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